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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this paper is on South Africa’s implementation and application of the international 
principles relating to transfer pricing in its domestic legislation as encapsulated in section 31 of the 
Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962.  
Transfer pricing is currently one of the more important short term international tax considerations, 
specifically in the South African context where recent amendments, particularly with regard to thin 
capitalisation, have created a degree of commercial uncertainty for multinational enterprises. With 
regard to the South African context, this paper seeks to illustrate the increased compliance burden 
placed on South African taxpayers as a result of the 2012 amendment to section 31 of the Income Tax 
Act. While the revised section is aimed at reducing transfer pricing manipulation, the impact thereof 
on taxpayers is significant from both an administrative as well as financial perspective. 
In addition to evaluating the international principles and South Africa’s use thereof, this paper will also 
look at the extent to which developing countries are disadvantaged by the current transfer pricing 
framework. It is posited that the lack of access to resources, skills and expertises makes developing 
countries particularly vulnerable to base erosion and profit shifting by multinational enterprises.  
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Chapter I 
1. TRANSFER PRICING 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Transfer pricing refers to cross border transactions undertaken between connected parties
1
. The price 
of the transaction set by either party for the buying, selling or otherwise sharing of resources is referred 
to as the “transfer price”2. Transfer pricing rules are in place primarily to deal with any arbitrages 
created between the allocation of profits and the distribution of risks, assets and functions across 
connected party transaction which occur in different tax jurisdictions. The focus of this paper is on the 
international pricing framework provided by the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-
operation (“OECD”), the application of transfer pricing in the South African context, and an 
evaluation of difficulties arising in the application and implementation of transfer pricing principles in 
the developing country context. 
 
Apart from determining the allocation of profits among connected parties, the transfer price can also be 
used as a mechanism with which to manipulate
3
 the price at which goods or services are transferred by 
either acquiring or disposing of goods or services for a non-market related price. The scope this paper 
will be confined to an analysis of the internal transfer pricing framework and the amendments 
occasioned to section 31 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1963 (“ITA”). 
Transfer pricing has received increased attention both in South Africa and internationally because of 
its potential to influence the tax base of the host country
4
, and has become increasingly significant over 
the past two decades primarily due to the technological advancements which have allowed 
Multinational Enterprises (“MNEs”) to readily relocated goods, services, capital and resources to 
various tax jurisdictions
5
. In addition, globalisation has focused attention on transfer pricing, its 
potential manipulation and the consequences attended thereof
6
. Improved technology and economic 
                                                 
1
 A W Oguttu “Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Is the Arm’s-Length Principle Still Relevant in the e-Commerce Era” 
(2006) 18 SA Merc LJ at 139 
2
 Ibid at 139 
3
 Ibid at 139 
4
 Ibid at 139 
5
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2010) Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development pg17 
6
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines OP cit 5at 1 
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integration has given MNEs greater flexibility in accessing world markets
7
. A significant portion of 
world trade is conducted between connected parties; this unprecedented market share
8
 has made MNEs 
the force that “drives globalization forward”9. The unparalleled growth in cross border transactions has 
significantly contributed to the complexity surrounding transfer pricing policies
10
. 
 Globalization has enabled MNEs to use cross border transactions as a vehicle for tax savings through 
the use of subsidiaries in tax havens or low tax jurisdictions
11
. Countries are becoming increasingly 
aware of the lost revenue resulting from distorted transfer prices. Tax administrations in both 
developed and developing countries have an interest in protecting their respective tax bases, hence the 
proliferation in transfer pricing policies and regulations among countries at different stages of 
economic and social development. 
Underlying transfer pricing is the notion of “connected” or “related” parties transacting together in 
cross border arrangements. The component parts — parent and subsidiary companies or companies 
under a degree of common control
12
 — of a Group entity are referred to as an associated enterprise13, 
governed by Article 9 (the “Associated Enterprise Article”) of the OECD 2003 Articles of Model 
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (the “MTC”). The MTC codifies various 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, and condenses these into a single document accepted and applied by 
both OECD member and non-member countries. The Associated Enterprise Article contains important 
pronouncements on the taxation of associated enterprises, as well as the acceptance of the arm’s length 
principle as the mechanism for determining the appropriateness of the price of the transaction. 
The arm’s length principle is fundamental in the transfer pricing rhetoric14, and refers to the market 
price ordinarily achieved between unrelated parties transacting independently of one another (the 
“Uncontrolled Transaction”)15. The basic premise is that commercial transactions between 
independent parties will necessarily be subject to external market factors — the valuation of the 
                                                 
7
 United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (2013) New York at 1.1.2 available at 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf [accessed 05/02/2014] 
8
A 2012 Article published on the tax justice network, available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=139 [accessed 15/10/2013] suggests that the extent of international 
trade conducted between members of the same group could be as high as 70% 
9
 A W Oguttu “Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance” op cit 1 at 140-141 
10
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.1.4 
11
 A W Oguttu “Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance” op cit 1 at 140-141 
12
 OECD “Commentary on Article 9 Concerning the Taxation of Associated Enterprises” at 1 
13
United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.5 
14
United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.1.7 
15
 L Olivier, M Honiball “International Ta A South African Perspective” (2011) 5th Ed at 620 
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transaction will reflect market conditions as each party will seek to achieve the most advantageous 
position. However where connected parties transact (the “Controlled Transaction”), the price 
attributed to the arrangement is not necessarily determined by external market factors
16
. Often the 
interests of the MNE involved in the transaction will determine the terms and price of the transaction
17
.  
The increased attention towards transfer pricing is also due in large part to its potential to distort 
revenue streams in the host country
18
. As a result, where the transfer price is not concluded in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle, the relevant tax administration is often empowered under 
its national legislation to adjust the transfer price to ensure that the parties are adequately compensated 
in accordance with the risks and functions performed. 
Transfer pricing in itself is not illegal or an abuse of tax policy. However, the intentional “mispricing” 
of a transaction is an abuse and constitutes tax evasion
19
. Incorrectly pricing or mispricing cross border 
transactions allows for profit manipulation, which occurs in a number of ways and for a variety of 
reasons. Transfer pricing allows entities to create a lower aggregate tax burden for the MNE by 
shifting profits to a lower tax jurisdiction; or by utilizing tax deductions in high tax jurisdictions
20
. 
Transfer pricing therefore enables connected parties to distort revenue streams and manipulate their 
profit margin in a given country, thereby directly influencing the tax base of the host country
21
.  
While transfer pricing may be used for tax evasion or avoidance purposes, the issues arising from 
cross-border ventures should not be conflated with those of unlawful tax evasion. Where enterprises 
have intentionally “mis-priced”, “unjustifiably priced”, or “incorrectly priced” the transaction, issues 
of tax evasion may become relevant
22
. The primary concerns in the international tax arena are the 
allocation of income, determination of the transfer price, and double taxation.  
Transactions which occur in multiple tax locations raise issues relating to jurisdiction and the 
allocation of profits
23
, which determine the extent to which countries are able to tax the profit streams 
of MNEs located therein. Ordinarily, the principal basis for asserting taxing rights is either residency 
                                                 
16
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines op cit 5 at 1.2  
17
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.1.5 
18
 Ibid at 1.3  
19
L Sheppard “Transfer Pricing is at the leading edge of what is wrong with international tax” available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=139 [accessed 16/10/ 2013) 
20
 L Olivier, Ml Honiball “International Tax: A South African Perspective” op cit 15 at 620 
21
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.2.1-1.2.5 
22
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.1.7  
23
 Ibid at 1.2.2 
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or source of the income
24
. A country which taxes on the basis of residency will tax all income of 
natural and juristic persons resident in its jurisdiction, irrespective of the source of the income. Source-
based tax empowers the relevant authority to tax income arising exclusively within its tax jurisdiction. 
OECD member countries advocate the separate entity approach as it facilitates tax parity
25
 by 
mitigating the risk of double taxation by treating each entity within the MNE as a distinct economic 
unit.  
The transfer price determines the income of the parties and influences the tax base of countries hosting 
the MNEs
26
. Where an MNE is located in more than one tax jurisdiction, the difficulties arise in 
determining which country is authorised or entitled to tax the income stream. Where an MNE is liable 
to pay tax in multiple jurisdictions on the same income stream it will be subject to double taxation. 
Double taxation is problematic insofar as it increases operating costs, thereby making it expensive to 
operate in multiple jurisdictions, which ultimately impacts on foreign direct investments (FDI). If the 
tax base arises in more than one country, the MNE requires a degree of relief to mitigate the double 
taxation burden
27
. Double taxation may motivate MNEs to reallocate and manipulate their profits 
through non-arm’s length transfer prices, which would then (depending on the applicable national 
legislation) constitute unlawful evasion or avoidance
28
. Allocation of income to the MNEs in a given 
country is therefore critical as the allocation and valuation thereof directly impacts on the tax base in a 
given country. 
Transfer pricing is one of the most significant short term taxation issues
29
 — its complex, multifaceted 
nature makes its appropriate regulation equally important to both MNEs and tax administrations. 
Various difficulties arise at both the practical and policy making levels, these issues relate primarily to 
the identification of transfer pricing principles and the application of transfer pricing methodologies. 
The OECD has contributed, through its publications, towards an increasingly unified approach to the 
treatment of transfer pricing internationally.  
In 1979, the OECD published general guidelines, “The Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (the “OECD Guidelines”) to assist countries in the 
                                                 
24
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines preface op cit 5pg 17-18 at 5-6 
25
 Ibid pg 17-18 at 5-6 
26
United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 at 1.2.1 
27
 Ibid at 1.2.3. 
28
 Ibid at 1.2.4. 
29
 L Olivier and Michael Honiball “International Tax: A South African Perspective” op cit 15 at 621 
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implementation and application of transfer pricing policies. The OECD Guidelines, which the OECD 
has undertaken to regularly update to ensure the continued economic relevance thereof, provide a 
comprehensive framework for both member and non-member countries interacting in the transfer 
pricing arena. The purpose of the OECD Guidelines is inter alia to simplify the application of transfer 
pricing principles and to ensure uniform implementation to prevent the creation of preferential tax 
regimes.  
The OECD Guidelines are seen as being an authoritative source on transfer pricing by both member 
and non-member countries alike. South Africa, a non-member country, has incorporated many of the 
principles encapsulated in the OECD Guidelines into its domestic legislation, specifically in the 
context of Section 31 of the ITA. Consequently, the focus of the second half of the paper is on the 
approach South Africa has taken to transfer pricing in light of the international principles contained in 
the OECD publications. Thereafter this paper will briefly consider the challenges faced by developing 
countries in their effort to both create and subsequently implement transfer pricing parameters. 
 
1.2 RELEVANCE OF TRANSFER PRICING 
Transfer pricing is currently one of the more important short term international tax considerations, 
specifically in the South African context where recent amendments, particularly with regard to thin 
capitalisation, have created a degree of commercial uncertainty for MNEs. Transfer pricing can be 
used as a mechanism for relocating profits to a more favourable tax jurisdiction for the purposes of 
obtaining a tax benefit. Accordingly, transfer pricing is increasingly being seen as a risk which 
requires proper management; hence the proliferation in transfer pricing legislation and guidelines in 
recent years. 
Various agencies have undertaken the management and development of transfer pricing material. 
These include inter alia the OECD and United Nations (“UN”), both of which have compiled 
guidelines to assist tax authorities and MNEs in the regulation of this area of international tax. 
Overwhelmingly, audits conducted on large MNEs are concerned with the transfer price and whether it 
reflects market conditions. Transfer pricing over the past two decades has become an increasingly 
important consideration for both tax administrations and MNEs and will continue to be of consequence 
for the foreseeable future. Dispute prevention procedures, such as Advanced Pricing Agreements 
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(“APAs”), may become more prevalent as MNEs and tax authorities are required to reach efficient, 
cost effective solutions to transfer pricing issues. 
  
1.3 OBJECTS OF THE STUDY 
The focus of this study is on the application of the principles contained in the OECD Guidelines in the 
South African context.  The objective of this study is twofold: firstly to identify the internationally 
accepted transfer pricing principles and methodologies as encapsulated in both the Model Tax 
Conventions (“MTC”) and the OECD Guidelines, and thereafter, the identification and analysis of the 
aforementioned principles in the South African context. 
The section 31 ITA analysis will include a consideration of the changes brought about to the section by 
the various amendments enacted by the Legislature and the impact thereof on the transactions of 
connected persons in their multinational structuring arrangements. 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY USED 
This study is exclusively a desk based one; as such the materials utilized are both primary and 
secondary sources. The conventions and guidelines published by the OECD, the various manuals 
issued by the OECD and UN, as well as South African legislation will form the backbone upon which 
this research paper is based. Where necessary, journal articles, books and internet articles are used to 
supplement the primary sources. 
  
DNXKIR001 2014 
 
11 
Chapter II 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING PRINCIPLES 
The focus of Chapter II is on the international treatment of transfer pricing. The OECD advocates the 
arm’s length approach to transfer pricing in both the Associated Enterprise Article (Article 9 of the 
MTC) as well as in the OECD Guidelines. As such a detailed analysis of this cornerstone principle is 
required. Chapter II will focus on the origins of the arm’s length principle, the methodologies for its 
calculation, factors affecting its application, and criticisms levelled against it. The final analysis 
contained in Chapter II will involve a consideration of global formulary apportionment, an approach 
perceived by critics as being an alternative to the arm’s length principle. Further, this paper will 
illustrate why global formulary apportionment has not received international application by outlining 
the fundamental criticisms levelled in relation to this theory.  
 
2.1 BACKGROUND TO TRANSFER PRICING 
International bodies have played an important role in developing, shaping and harmonizing transfer 
pricing material; as such an overview of the approaches taken by these organisations is critical.  
The OECD’s predecessor the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation (“OEEC”) was 
established in 1947 to implement and facilitate the US led Marshall Plan
30
 which was aimed at the 
reconstruction of post-WWII Europe. The success of the OEEC resulted in Canada and the United 
States of America (“USA”) joining the original members of the multi-country forum. In furtherance of 
international economic collaboration, the OECD Convention was signed in December 1960. By 1961, 
the Convention was accepted, and by the 30
th
 of September 1961 the OECD was established
31
. The 
OECD, as well as its predecessor the OEEC, was instrumental in forcing countries to recognise the 
interdependent nature of their respective economies, and as a result by 1964
32
 various other countries 
                                                 
30
 “OECD History” available at www.oecd.org/history [accessed 28/12/2012] 
31
 Ibid 
32
 Ibid 
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had begun to join the founding OECD member countries in a collective effort to stimulate international 
economic co-operation.  
The stated purpose of the OECD is to utilize all the information at its disposal to assist governments in 
combating poverty and promoting prosperity through economic growth and integration
33
. The primary 
function of the OECD remains its publications which are instrumental in circulating the organisation’s 
“intellectual output”34. In addition the OECD is also involved in various administrative roles such as 
conducting peer reviews, implementing standards and recommendations and facilitating multilateral 
agreements.  
The OECD’s 1979 report on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises was instrumental in 
laying the groundwork for transfer pricing governance. The 1979 report was followed by another 
report in 1995, which provided clearly defined economic parameters within which to locate transfer 
pricing regulations. Since then, the report has been updated on a number of occasions to ensure that it 
keeps abreast with economic realities. The 2010 edition of the OECD Guidelines is the latest 
amendment to the original 1979 report. The OECD Guidelines provide detailed information on the 
application of the arm’s length principle, its status in international law, methodologies for its 
calculation, factors affecting its application, required documentation and dispute resolution procedures. 
To date, the OECD Guidelines remain one of the most comprehensive documents on transfer pricing 
and have been accepted by both member and strategically significant non-member countries such as 
South Africa and Russia. 
In addition to the OECD reports, the OECD has produced and facilitated the implementation of a 
number of founding transfer pricing documents, most notably the MTC. The MTC is the culmination 
and codification of various bilateral and multilateral treaties and finds application among both OECD 
member and non-member countries. The primary significance of the OECD MTC is its encapsulation 
of the arm’s length principle, which provides the framework for the taxation of MNEs.  
Along with the OECD, the UN has played an important role in clarifying transfer pricing issues, 
specifically those relating to the developed/developing context. From as early as the 1980s, the UN 
began to publish reports on transfer pricing, starting with the 1988 report on International Income 
Taxation and Developing Countries which looked at the manipulation of transfer pricing by MNEs to 
                                                 
33
 “What we do and How” available at http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ [accessed 28/12/2012] 
34
 Ibid 
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the detriment of developing host countries
35
. The 2003 United Nations Model Double Tax Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries (“UN Model Convention”) cemented the arm’s length 
principle in the developing country rhetoric. The UN reports address specific developmental issues, 
such as the lack of skills, resources and regulation, which arise in the developing country context and 
seek to provide solutions to some of the problems identified. Other relevant material produced by the 
UN includes its Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries. The value of this manual has been 
questioned by critics as the OECD Guidelines are already viewed as being an authoritative source of 
transfer pricing by both member and key non-member countries such as South African and Russia. The 
UN approach to transfer pricing endorses the OECD arm’s length approach, providing a coherent body 
of material and expertise from which developing countries may draw upon. 
The move toward a more unified approach to transfer pricing is facilitated by the approaches taken in 
both the UN Model Convention and the OECD Guidelines, which have greatly influenced international 
treaty practice and have contributed to tax parity in transfer pricing
36
. The Associated Enterprise 
Article (Article 9) found in both the OECD and UN Conventions have endorsed and entrenched the 
arm’s length principle in international tax law.  
Accordingly, recent international practice in the context of developed countries has largely been 
uniform in its treatment of transfer pricing. As such, the remainder of the chapter will deconstruct the 
cornerstone of transfer pricing—the arm’s length principle. 
 
2.2 THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
 
2.2.1 DEFINITION  
Black’s Law dictionary defines the arm’s length principle as:  
                                                 
35
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7  at 3.10  
36
 United Nations Model Double Tax Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (1979) at 2 
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“A transaction in good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with independent interests 
commonly applied in areas of taxation when there are dealings between related corporations”37. 
 
2.2.2 ARTICLE 9 OF THE OECD 
The Associated Enterprise Article
38
 provides that: 
“[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of those enterprises, but, 
by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the 
profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. 
The significance of the Associated Enterprise Article is that it provides a basis, in the form of the 
arm’s length principle, for the evaluation of transactions concluded between connected parties. Where 
the transactional price is not market related, the relevant Tax administration is empowered to adjust the 
                                                 
37
 Black, H.C, Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Ed (1990) at 109 
38
 Article 9 OECD Model Tax Convention: 
“9(1) Where 
 
a. an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
 
b. the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or 
financial  differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reasons of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 
 
9(2) Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State—and taxes 
accordingly—profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in 
that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the enterprise for the 
first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which would 
have been made between independent enterprises, the other State shall make an appropriate adjustment 
to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard 
shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting 
State shall if necessary consult each other.” 
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price accordingly. The Associated Enterprise Article has largely been incorporated into South African 
domestic legislation through Section 31 of the Income Tax Act. 
 
2.2.3 BASIS FOR APPLICATION OF THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
The significance of the arm’s length principle is that empowers tax authorities to adjust the income of 
the taxpayer in appropriate circumstances where there has been a transaction concluded between 
connected parties on a non-arm’s length basis39. The principle is premised on equivalent transactions 
achieving the same price, and where those prices differ, the Associated Enterprise Article empowers 
tax authorities to adjust the profit and thereafter tax the adjusted amount. Arm’s length trading is 
premised on two independent parties trading together. Consequently the use of the arm’s length 
standard to evaluate transactions concluded between connected parties necessarily requires an 
evaluation of surrounding market conditions. A price obtained as a result of a transaction between 
associated enterprises is more likely to be affected by factors other than external market conditions. 
Therefore, the comparable uncontrolled transaction is the standard against which the price of the 
controlled transaction is gauged. 
Article 9(1) empowers the relevant tax authority to adjust a controlled transaction so as to reflect a 
price within the arm’s length range, provided special conditions were made or imposed which would 
not ordinarily have been present in a transaction concluded on normal commercial terms
40
. 
Article 9(1) applies in the determination of any contract concluded between related parties. It governs 
the purchase or transfer of property (corporeal and intangible property) or services; interest on loans 
(including whether the amount itself constitutes a loan or any other form of payment); as well as rules 
relating to the application of thin capitalisation
41
.  
The notion of associated enterprise(s) is an essential element of the arm’s length definition. Two or 
more enterprises are considered to be “associated” where there is an element of i) common control 
which exists where “one enterprise participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
                                                 
 
39
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines op cit 5 pg 33 at 1.6 
40
 Commentary on Article 9 op cit 12  pg 141 at 3 
41
 Ibid pg 141 at 2 
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capital of the other enterprise”42; or ii) if the same person “participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital”43 of both enterprises. The extent of common control exercised over 
the associated enterprises can significantly affect the price of the transactions under consideration. In 
contrast, an arrangement between unconnected enterprises would not be subject to such constraints as 
they are ordinarily determined and regulated by external market factors. 
The power of a tax administrator to adjust the transaction arises from Article 9(2) of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, which states that: 
“Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State—and taxes 
accordingly—profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to 
tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the 
enterprise for the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had 
been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, the other State shall 
make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In 
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this 
Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting State shall if necessary consult 
each other.” 
Article 9(2) governs the implementation of Article 9(1). Where an adjustment is required, it may result 
in double taxation. Article 9(2) allows for an “appropriate adjustment” of tax charged to limit the 
extent of the double taxation. The adjustment to the profits in the second contracting state is not 
automatic; it will only be implemented where the second state deems that the re-written profits reflect 
the amounts which would have been present had the transaction been concluded at arm’s length44.  
The implication of the above is that where the adjusted profits are deemed excessive, the second 
contracting state is not obliged to affect any changes. Further the adjustment to relieve the double 
taxation burden is only applied where the amount, in light of the arm’s length principle, justifies its 
amendment
45
. Sub-paragraph 2 does not prescribe the amount or manner in which the adjustment must 
be corrected; it merely stipulates that it must reflect an “appropriate” alteration. This gives contracting 
states considerable autonomy in revising the profits and taxes imposed on associated enterprises. 
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The statement of the arm’s length principle in the UN Model Convention46 reiterates the approach 
taken by the OECD. The arm’s length principle has been accepted as an authoritative mechanism for 
calculating and adjusting profits among associated enterprises.  
 
2.3 ORIGINS 
The arm’s length principle has its origins in both European treaty law and American contract law. 
Continental European countries first utilized the concept when shareholders or directors received 
excessive benefits from their companies instead of declaring dividends on profits
47. The arm’s length 
principle operated by amending the hidden profit distributions obtained through the tax benefits 
received by shareholders. The application of the arm’s length principle in Europe was focused on 
domestic corporate regulation rather than international treaty law. 
The USA and the United Kingdom (“UK”) have successfully exported the principle through 
multilateral treaties
48
. The USA in particularly has been a driver of the arm’s length principle, using it 
                                                 
46
 UN Model Convention Article 9: 
“1. Where: 
 
a. Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
 
b.  The same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case 
conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial 
relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason 
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly. 
  
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State—and taxes accordingly—profits 
on enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included 
are profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between 
the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other 
State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In 
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of the Convention and the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall, if necessary, consult each other. 
 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply where judicial, administrative or other legal proceedings have 
resulted in a final ruling that by actions giving rise to an adjustment of profits under paragraph 1, one of the 
enterprises concerned is liable to penalty with respect to fraud, gross negligence or wilful default.” 
47
H, Black Blacks Law Dictionary 6
th
 Ed (1990) at 109 
48
 B Lebowitz, “Transfer Pricing and the end of International Tax” 84 Tax Notes 1523 at 4 
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both in its domestic law and international negotiations
49
. The USA has used the principle effectively to 
protect its tax base from erosion in part by pregnating international forums with the principle, thereby 
further insulating its domestic tax bases against transfer pricing manipulation
50
. 
 
2.4 TRANSFER PRICING METHODS 
 
2.4.1 FACTORS INFORMING THE SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE TRANSFER 
PRICING METHOD 
The selection of an appropriate transfer pricing method is an integral part of the evaluation of the 
transaction. Selection of the appropriate methodology depends largely on the information available to 
the taxpayer. In the developing country context, access to comparable uncontrolled information is a 
significant obstacle to the taxpayer. Transfer pricing works by selecting an appropriate benchmark 
transaction where the price is undisputed against a controlled transaction. Significant price differences 
between the controlled and benchmark transactions is usually an indicator that the former has not been 
concluded on an arm’s length basis. Consequently, the accuracy of the transfer pricing analysis 
depends in part on the comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. The 
comparability analysis serves to highlight the extent to which the uncontrolled transaction is 
comparable to the controlled transaction. Where minor differences exist between the two, adjustments 
can be made to the extent that it eliminates any material differences. Once the uncontrolled transaction 
is comparable to the controlled transaction, an appropriate transfer pricing method can then be selected 
based on the information available. If an inappropriate method is selected and implemented, the result 
obtained will be an inaccurate reflection of the value attributed to the transaction in the open market. 
 
                                                 
49
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2.4.2 THE COMPARABILITY FACTORS 
The application of the arm’s length principle is premised on the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions being sufficiently similar; this necessarily requires that there can be no material 
differences which would affect the conditions under consideration
51
. Transactions are considered to be 
comparable if there are no material differences which would affect the underlying factor being 
accounted for in the transaction method; or if the difference can be reasonably adjusted for to eliminate 
the materiality of same. The primary purpose for performing the comparability analysis is to determine 
the appropriateness of the transfer price between connected parties against the price achieved between 
independent parties.  
Economic theory is premised on independent parties striving to obtain the most advantageous 
transaction. This means that an independent enterprise will only enter into the most favourable 
transaction available
52
, and that independent parties do not have to consider group interests when 
transacting. Market factors play an important role in determining the potential comparability of the 
controlled and uncontrolled transaction. The use of the arm’s length principle to determine the 
appropriateness of the price concluded between associated enterprises necessarily requires an 
evaluation of the surrounding market conditions
53
.  
 On a controlled transaction, additional considerations may influence the transaction. One of the parties 
to a controlled transaction may suffer a disadvantage as a direct result of having concluded the 
transaction, however, this may still result in an overall benefit for the group as a whole. In an 
uncontrolled transaction the same is not true — both parties will seek to achieve the best possible 
results for themselves, if the net result of the transaction is a disadvantage, then independent parties are 
more likely not to contract with one another.  
Comparability is primarily determined with regards to the characteristics of the particular transaction, 
the functional analysis, and the surrounding economic circumstances. There are various comparability 
factors which must considered when selecting a test transaction, and where necessary be adjusted for, 
these include
54
: 
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 PWC International Transfer Pricing 2012 available at www.pwc.com/internationaltp [accessed 20/12/2013] at 56 
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 Characteristics of the property / services; 
 The functional analysis; 
 Contractual terms; 
 Economic circumstances; and 
 Business strategies. 
One of the many difficulties experienced by South Africa as a developing country
55
, and Africa in 
general, relates to the lack of domestic comparables against which to peg the controlled 
transaction
56
.Presently, there are no databases available which contain information on comparable data 
relating to developing countries.  
The evaluation of highly specialised products, such as intellectual property, is often difficult to 
evaluate for tax purposes
57
 as few comparables exist against which to compare the tested transaction. 
The term intellectual property is widely defined in the OECD Guidelines and includes patents, 
trademarks, trade names, designs or models. The arm’s length principle dictates that an appropriate 
uncontrolled comparable be used as a benchmark against which the controlled transaction is tested. 
However, transactions involving intellectual property are often unique due to the special nature and 
characteristics of the product
58
.  Apart from making is difficult to find the appropriate comparable, the 
nature of the intellectual property often makes it difficult to determine the value of the property at the 
time of the transaction
59
 
One of the primary difficulties with applying the arm’s length principle to transaction involving 
intellectual property is that the arm’s length pricing must be determined from both the transferor and 
transferees perspective
60
. Part of this analysis includes calculating the expected benefit which would be 
obtained with the use of the intellectual property. This undertaking is administratively intensive for the 
taxpayer and requires access to information which is not readily available. Some of the factors which 
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inform the arm’s length price and which the taxpayer may not have access to include the calculation 
the anticipated benefit associated with the use of the intellectual property, the geographical location of 
its use, the exclusivity of the right
61
 and valuing the property at the time of the transaction
62
.  
The selection of the appropriate comparable is difficult in the context of simple transactions, however, 
it is becomes even more complicated when the transaction concerned involves highly specialised 
products such as intellectual property. This is primarily due to the lack of information available 
regarding appropriate uncontrolled transactions. This problem is compounded exponentially in the 
context of developing countries which lack access to commercial databases, expertise and other 
resources required to complete a transfer pricing analysis. 
The lack of access to information is one of the many challenges more prevalent in the developing 
country context. Given the lack of access to information available relating to other developing 
countries, taxpayers are forced to use data obtained from developed countries, which necessarily 
requires that adjustments be made to account for market, political and geographical differences
63
 
which is often a complicated undertaking. The South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) has 
attempted to account for these differences and alleviate some of the burden placed on its taxpayers by 
implementing comparability adjustments, however, these are only applied in certain circumstances. 
 
2.4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTY / SERVICES 
Characteristic differences in property/services to an extent account for the different values attributed to 
same in the open market. Broadly speaking, characteristics which may be important to consider 
include: 
 in the case of corporeal property, physical features which play an important role in 
determining the value of the property. Relevant features may include the durability, quality 
and availability of the property
64
. In addition, economic theory dictates that scarce products 
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are more valuable. The more favourable the outcome in terms of quality, durability and 
scarcity, the more value is attributed to the property in the open market; and 
 in respect of intangible property, the value depends in part on the type of property sold, as 
well as the duration and extent of the protection afforded in terms thereof
65
. 
The various methodologies places emphasis on different aspects of a transaction, consequently, the 
selection of the methodology will influence the range of the transfer price to an extent. Traditional 
transaction methods place more emphasis on the product than transactional profit split methods. The 
comparable uncontrolled price (“CUP”) method places the most emphasis on the characteristics of 
property or services
66
, and as a result thereof, minor characteristic differences must be adjusted for in 
order to produce an appropriate comparable. In contrast, the transactional profit split methods focuses 
more on profit indicators in the transaction as opposed to the characteristics of the product or services.  
 
2.4.4 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functional analysis determines the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions, as 
well as the comparables which must be adjusted
67
. It also provides a means of understanding the nature 
of the transaction and the surrounding information by looking at the functions, risks
68
. and 
comparability of the transactions for the purposes of determining the allocation of same between the 
associated enterprises under the affected transaction
69
 and improving the selection of an appropriate 
transfer pricing method. The scope, nature and extent of the functional analysis will vary according to 
the specific transaction under consideration
70
. Adjustments need to be made for material differences 
which would affect the transaction and the potential comparability of the two transactions. The 
functional analysis should include an evaluation of, and where necessary adjust for, factors such as the 
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type of assets utilized in the transaction, valuable intangible resources, financial assets, risks assumed, 
and the nature of the assets used
71
. 
The functional analysis plays an important role in determining which transfer pricing method should 
be selected and applied to the controlled transaction
72
. Thus, a functional analysis is necessary for: 
 understanding the controlled transaction73; 
 determining whether controlled and uncontrolled transactions are comparable74; and 
 identifying characteristics in a particular transaction which would make it a suitable 
comparable and highlighting any potential differences which may require appropriate 
adjustment
75
.  
Risks undertaken by the parties must be allocated and compensated for in the functional analysis. 
Where one party carries a greater degree of risk, the party assuming that risk would anticipate a larger 
return in the open market as that party will carry the associated losses should the risk materialize
76
. 
The types of risk to be considered include market risks, risks associated with loss of investments or 
loss sustained to property and equipment, as well as financial risks such as those associated with 
fluctuations in currency
77
, interest rates and funding considerations. 
Economic circumstances play a significant role in determining the comparability of the controlled and 
uncontrolled transaction, and consequently forms part of the initial analysis. The economic 
environment affects the arm’s length price; the market conditions must therefore be sufficiently similar 
in order for the controlled and uncontrolled transactions to be alike for the purposes of determining 
comparability
78
. The availability of the particular product/service, the relative bargaining positions of 
the parties to the transaction and the risks assumed influence the economic market conditions within 
which the transaction is located
79
. 
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Where the market conditions are cyclical, multiple year data must be used to determine the similarity 
of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. The geographical location of the market affects the 
arm’s length range, assessing the similarity of markets is a factual consideration which the taxpayer 
undertakes which performing its transfer pricing analysis. In some jurisdictions, large industries 
stretching across multiple countries may prove to be sufficiently similar, while in other jurisdictions 
internal domestic markets may differ considerably. The nature of the transaction, product and 
economic environment will inform the comparability of the geographical market, which in turn will 
inform the comparability of the controlled and uncontrolled transaction. 
The functional analysis needs to differentiate between physical and intangible property utilized in and / 
or forming part of the transaction
80
. Capital assets such as property, and plant and equipment would 
usually enjoy a greater long term return. In contrast, intangible assets are useful insofar as they allow 
enterprises to sustain their competitive advantage in the market place. The analysis performed must 
necessarily distinguish the party which carries the legal risk from the party which carries the economic 
risk based on the terms of the transaction
81
. 
Increased economic integration has resulted in MNEs sharing both the risk and ownership of the 
assets
82
. This has added a level of complexity to the attribution of profits to a particular tax 
jurisdiction. The affect of increased assimilation means that in certain instances one party may perform 
the function while another party to the transaction accepts the costs attended thereof
83
.  
The integrated nature of MNEs has resulted in functions, risks and assets being shared between the 
different entities across various tax jurisdictions
84
. The functional analysis is able to deconstruct the 
different roles played by the parties in the transaction; thereby identifying benefits enjoyed by the 
respective parties and allocating the tax implications accordingly
85
.   
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2.4.5 CONTRACTUAL TERMS 
The contractual terms in an uncontrolled transaction are generally explicitly defined in the relevant 
agreement, and are not subsequently amended unless there are clear benefits for both parties in doing 
so. In contrast, the terms of a controlled transaction may be varied at any stage if it is in the interest of 
the MNE
86
. Information pertaining to the contractual terms of an uncontrolled transaction is not readily 
available as it is of a sensitive and confidential nature; this is particularly true where an external 
comparable is used. 
The contractual terms outline the financial and commercial conditions imposed on the associated 
enterprises entering into the transaction. These terms might favour one party in the group over the 
other, and may include terms which would not ordinarily be present between independent parties. In 
order for the controlled and uncontrolled transaction to be deemed comparable, the terms upon which 
the parties agree must be similar.  The extent to which contractual terms and the availability thereof 
affects the transfer price will depend on the particular transaction and the transfer pricing method 
selected. However, as indicated above, obtaining sufficient information relating to the contractual 
terms of the controlled transaction is often difficult as the reporting requirements and public databases 
may vary significantly between countries. 
The evaluation of contractual terms appears to be somewhat artificial in the context of permanent 
establishment (“PE”) which, unless incorporated as a subsidiary, is essentially the foreign branch of 
the MNE in a given country. Unlike with the creation of subsidiaries, branches do not have 
independent legal personality, as such it is treated as an extension of the non-resident parent. To the 
extent that an entity earns or derives income from a PE situated within the Republic, the income 
attributable thereto is subject to income tax at the appropriate rate. The parties to both sides of a 
controlled transaction involving a PE is effectively the offshore entity, consequently, assessing the 
terms from the perspective of the connected parties is therefore fruitless. 
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2.4.6 ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES 
The economic market governing the transaction affects the price of the products. As a result, the arm’s 
length price will vary between economic markets even where the transactions are in respect of or for 
the same product or service
87
. To ensure that the transactions are comparable, the markets in which the 
transactions occur must be sufficiently similar so as to ensure that there are no material differences 
which will affect the price of the product. 
Factors which may be applicable in determining market comparability include the geographical 
market; the size of the markets; the relative competitive position of both the buyer and seller; the 
availability of the product; the extent and nature of governmental regulation; and the costs associated 
with manufacturing the product
88
. 
Selecting a transaction from an appropriate geographical market is an important step in determining 
comparability as it plays an important role in determining the price of the product or service. 
Evaluating the appropriateness of the geographical market is a factual exercise. As indicated 
previously, differences in the geographical market may vary across different industries — large 
regional markets which stretch over a number of different countries may be fairly homogenous, while 
in other sectors there may be significant difference within a domestic market
89
. The suitability of the 
geographical market must be determined with reference to the particular product/service in question. 
Where the market is relatively homogenous, it is acceptable for the entity compiling the transfer 
pricing documentation to incorporate transactions from multiple countries which have similar market 
conditions in its analysis.  
 
2.4.7 BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
The business strategies of the entity involved in the uncontrolled transaction must also be evaluated 
when determining the potential comparability of a transaction for the purposes of transfer pricing. 
Business strategies are important because they take into account factors such as new product 
development, market penetration strategies, diversification of the product and risk aversion. These 
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factors may have a direct impact on the potential profitability of the product/service, which in turn 
impacts on the taxable income.  
A taxpayer engaging in market penetration schemes may result in the entity suffering an initial loss in 
the market; however this loss will be subsequently offset by the demand the product may create for 
other products/services sold by the company in question. A taxpayer entering a new market may 
initially incur higher costs for its products than that which would be expected from an established 
environment
90
. This would have a direct impact on the short terms profits attributable to the taxpayer, 
however it could create greater long term opportunities which would justify the initial expenses.  
Whilst business strategies play an important role in determining the comparability of a transaction, this 
information may not readily be available to the taxpayer for the purposes of calculating the appropriate 
transfer price as the information is often of a sensitive and confidential nature. 
 
2.4.8  TYPES OF COMPARABLES 
The taxpayer may utilise either internal or external comparables in its assessment of the uncontrolled 
transaction. An internal comparable refers to a transaction between one party to the controlled 
transaction and an independent party; an external comparable refers to a transaction concluded 
between two independent parties
91
. The use of internal comparables must comply with the 
comparability requirements outlined in paragraph 2.4.2.  
The selection of an appropriate external comparable is necessarily more complicated then the selection 
an internal comparable, and depends largely on the amount of publicly available information. 
Commercial databases can be a cost effective way of identifying external comparables
92
. Commercial 
databases are platforms which have been compiled by administrative bodies. Taxpayers making use of 
commercial databases must be aware that they were not compiled for transfer pricing purposes; and 
further that that information contained therein differs among countries depending on the reporting 
requirements of the specific country concerned
93
. Importantly not all commercial databases record the 
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same level of detail, which may impact on the ability to select an appropriate transfer pricing method. 
More significantly, commercial databases are compiled to compare the results of companies as a whole 
as opposed to specific transactions
94
. Whilst commercial databases may be used, the information 
obtained from them must be carefully scrutinised to ensure that it is appropriate for transfer pricing 
purposes. 
Confidentiality requirements necessarily restrict the amount of information publicly available in 
respect of an external comparable
95
. The taxpayer will need to supplement information obtained from a 
commercial database with other publicly available information. Access to sufficiently detailed 
information remains one of the many obstacles which a taxpayer has to overcome when conducting a 
transfer pricing analysis. 
 
2.5 OECD METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING AN APPROPRIATE ARM’S 
LENGTH PRICE 
The OECD Guidelines identify various methods which may be used to test whether the transfer price is 
concluded on an arm’s length basis96. There methods can broadly be categorized in terms of the (i) 
traditional transaction methods and the (ii) transactional profit methods.  
The OECD Guidelines do not require the use of multiple methods. Instead the selection of the 
appropriate method is informed by a combination of factors including the results of the comparability 
analysis and information available. The OECD has taken cognisance of the difficulty imposed on a 
taxpayer in compiling the relevant transfer pricing information and documentation. As different 
methods require different types of information, the taxpayer is only require to perform a transfer 
pricing analysis using the most appropriate method in light of the information available
97
. However, in 
particularly complicated transactions, the taxpayer may use information obtained from multiple 
methods to supplement available information
98
. Whilst the OECD Guidelines outline both the potential 
advantages and difficulties associated with the use of various sources of information, the inclusion or 
                                                 
94
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines op cit 5   at 3.31 to 3.32 
95
 Ibid at 3.37 
96
 United Nations Practical Manual op cit 7 pg 116 
97
 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines op cit 5 at 2.2 
98
 Ibid at 2.6-2.7 
DNXKIR001 2014 
 
29 
exclusion thereof is left at the discretion of the taxpayer, subject only to the proviso that the 
information selected is sufficiently comparable to justify its application
99
. 
 
2.5.1 TRADITIONAL TRANSACTION METHODS 
Chapter II of the OECD Guidelines outlines the traditional transaction methods and how they apply in 
relation to the arm’s length principle. The traditional transaction methods places a greater emphasis on 
the price attributed to the products under the transaction, consequently they are particularly sensitive to 
product variance and market conditions. The traditional transaction methods, which include the 
comparable uncontrolled price, the reseal price method and the cost plus method, provide for the direct 
substitution of prices between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions.  
 
2.5.1.1 COMPARABLE UNCONTROLLED PRICE METHOD 
The CUP method compares the price charged in respect of a property or service in a controlled 
transaction to the price achieved in a similar uncontrolled transaction. Significant differences between 
the two prices, as illustrated by the direct substitution of prices, may indicate that the financial and 
commercial conditions imposed in the controlled transaction do not reflect an arm’s length range100.   
In order to apply the CUP method, the controlled and uncontrolled transaction in respect of the product 
or service must be similar and must occur in comparable economic environments. The accuracy of this 
method depends on the similarities between the characteristics of the product or service.  This 
necessarily entails that the products being compared are similar in terms of the level of product, 
quality, quantity, and geographical market
101
. Any variance with regards to the product or the 
conditions under which it is sold will have a significant impact on the price; this makes it particularly 
difficult to find an appropriate uncontrolled transaction using the CUP method. 
The CUP method is the preferred method where an enterprise sells the same product to that sold 
between the two connected enterprises. In order to apply the CUP method in a manner which complies 
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with the arm’s length principle as encapsulated in the Associated Enterprise Article, the independent 
transaction must be similar in terms of the product or service, level of production, quality, quantity, 
characteristics, and geographical markets; and where any material differences exist they must be 
removed by an appropriate adjustment. If a reasonably accurate adjustment cannot be made then the 
reliability of the CUP method will significantly diminished
102
. 
 The difficulty with applying the CUP method is that any variance between the products in the 
controlled and uncontrolled transaction will have a significant impact on the price of the transaction. 
Therefore, while in theory the CUP method is the less complicated method, in practice the 
vulnerability of the method to product variance makes its application problematic. 
The advantage to using the CUP method is that if an appropriate comparable can be found, the CUP 
method provides for the direct substitution of the price achieved in the controlled transaction with that 
obtained in the uncontrolled transaction. However, one of the biggest problems with this methodology 
in the developing country context is that many industries simply do not have access to the required 
information to enable them to perform the analysis
103
. Whilst in theory this method is the simplest 
option as it provides for direct price substitution, few industries in the market place satisfy the 
comparability requirements. Given how sensitive this methodology is to product variance, it is simply 
not a commercially realistic option given the lack of access developing countries have to both 
resources and information.  
 
2.5.1.2 RESALE PRICE METHOD 
The resale price (“RP”) method compares the price at which tangibles are purchased from a connected 
party against that achieved when it is resold to an independent party. The financial ratio used in 
calculating the arm’s length price is the gross profit margin (gross profit to net sales ratio104) which is 
expressed as a percentage
105
. The resale price is subsequently reduced by an appropriate gross 
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margin
106
 (resale price margin). The amount remaining after the subtraction of the resale price margin 
and adjustments for other necessary costs constitutes the arm’s length price of the transaction107. 
As the gross profit margin is weighted against the gross profit to net sales ratio, the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions must utilise the same or similar accounting standards. If the entity involved 
in the uncontrolled transaction utilises a different accounting standard, the RP method would not be 
appropriate as the gross profit margins between the two entities would not be comparable
108
. 
The accuracy of the RP method depends on i)comparability of functions performed, ii) the level of 
costs at which the product is bought and subsequently sold and iii) the calculation of an appropriate 
resale margin
109
. Where one or more of the aforementioned factors are missing or unidentifiable, the 
RP method is not capable of producing an accurate calculation of the arm’s length price. 
Whilst physical product difference can be accounted for under this method, the likelihood of functional 
differences arising increases exponentially with the product variation
110
.  
The resale margin of the associated enterprise may be determined with reference margins obtained by 
an independent party (internal comparable); or it with reference to independent entities in a 
comparable uncontrolled transaction (external comparable)
111
. 
The RP method is most appropriate where parties do not add significant value to the product prior to 
reselling, consequently, where either and/or both parties further process the product to the extent that a 
new product is created, the calculation of the transfer price would be difficult. 
 
2.5.1.3 COST PLUS METHOD 
The cost plus (“CP”) method calculates the transfer price by adding an appropriate cost plus mark-up 
to the costs incurred by the party selling the product in the controlled transaction. The cost plus mark-
up, which is expressed as a percentage, must reflect the assets used and the risks assumed by the tested 
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party
112
. The CP method compares the gross profit mark-up achieved by the tested party against the 
gross profit mark-up earned by an independent party in an uncontrolled transaction. The mark-up 
reflects the percentage of profits which the tested party could be expected to earn after deducting the 
direct and indirect costs associated with manufacturing the product
113
.  
The gross profit mark-up is expressed as the ratio of the gross profit earned by the tested party to the 
costs of the goods sold. The gross profit is the amount earned from the sale of the product / service less 
the cost of the goods. As this method uses the costs of the products as a component of the gross profit 
ratio, the controlled and uncontrolled transaction must utilise similar accounting standards. Where the 
accounting standards differ substantially, adjustments must be made to ensure that the gross profit is 
calculated consistently
114
.  
There are various advantages associated with the selection and implementation of the CP method for 
transfer pricing purposes. Primarily, the CP method allows, similar to the RP method, for greater 
product differentiation. The basis of comparability in the CP method is that of functional similarity, 
and as a result less emphasis is placed on the physical characteristics of the product
115
. The second 
significant advantage with the CP method is that it is based on internal information to which the tested 
party necessarily has access to as opposed to the two previous methods which require access to 
information which is less likely to be publicly available. 
The disadvantages attendant on this transfer pricing method relate primarily to the calculation of costs. 
As the determination of costs is fundamental to calculating the gross margin mark-up, any accounting 
differences will have a significant impact on the range achieved using the CP method. Difficulties may 
arise when the tested party incurred the costs of the product in the preceding financial year but sold the 
product in the following year as this will impact on the accounting treatment
116
. 
The CP method is not the appropriate mechanism for determining the transfer price where the tested 
party is a complex manufacturer which owns valuable intangible property used in the manufacturing 
process of the product. This is primarily because the calculation of the gross margin mark-up is central 
to the application of the CP method. Where both parties to the controlled transaction perform value-
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add functions, it becomes complicated to allocate the profits earned between the appropriate parties. 
Furthermore, in practice, it is difficult to find an appropriate external comparable against which to 
judge the controlled transaction
117
. The optimum circumstances for the application of the CP method is 
where one party assumes the majority of the risk, performs the more complex functions under the 
agreement and controls the assets, while the other party to the transaction (the tested party) performs a 
relatively simple manufacturing processes. 
Whilst the CP method does provide a mechanism for calculating the transfer price in relation to the 
arm’s length transaction, it is not the preferred method for doing so. The selection of the CP over the 
RP method, or vice versa, will depend entirely on the facts available regarding the controlled 
transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transaction.  One of the bases for preferring the CP 
method over the RP method is that the amount reached using the former is more readily accepted by 
tax and customs authorities as it provides some indication that the transfer price approximates the cost 
of the item and therefore its market value. 
 
2.5.2 TRANSACTIONAL PROFIT SPLIT METHODS 
Where the parties perform highly integrated functions or where both parties add value to the product 
before on-selling, the transactional profit split methods are the more reliable options for the purposes 
of calculating the transfer price. As with the traditional transaction methods, the profit based methods 
must conform to the Associated Enterprise Article in order for it to be compliant with the OECD 
Guidelines. 
Transactional profit split methods focus on the allocation of profits between connected parties, while 
the traditional transaction methods compare prices achieved in the controlled transaction against that 
earned in the uncontrolled transaction.  
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2.5.2.1 TRANSACTIONAL NET MARGIN METHOD 
The transaction net margin (“TNM”) method calculates the transfer price by examining the net profit 
in relation to an appropriate base. The net margin can be weighted to either sales earned, the costs of 
producing the goods or the assets owned.  This method is similar to the RP and CP method in the sense 
that the calculation and application of the financial ratio must be applied consistently across both the 
tested party and the comparable uncontrolled transaction
118
. 
One of the strengths of the TNM method is that the net profit indicator is less affected by transactional 
differences because the ratio is weighted against sales, costs or assets.  Whilst functional difference is 
still important, it is less of a consideration with the TNM method as opposed to the RP and CP 
methods which rely almost exclusively on the functional analysis for their accuracy
119
. As with the CP 
and RP methods, the TNM method is only applied to one party to the transaction (the tested party). As 
a one sided method, it cannot therefore account for transactions where both parties add value to the 
product before reselling it. The net profit margin earned by the tested party in the controlled 
transaction is compared to the net margin earned by an independent entity in the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction. Any significant differences which exist between the two figures could 
potentially be an indication that the controlled transaction has not been priced on an arm’s length basis. 
One of the weaknesses with the TNM method is that the net profit indicator could be affected by 
factors such as the relative competitive positions of the parties, which cannot easily be adjusted for. 
The successful application of the TNM method depends on the calculation of the net profit indicators, 
if these figures are not available or cannot be calculated for a comparable uncontrolled transaction, this 
method should not be used
120
. 
 
2.5.2.2 TRANSACTION PROFIT SPLIT METHOD 
 The transaction profit split (“TPS”) method is premised on the entities involved in the controlled 
transaction performing highly specialised functions of an integrated nature. Given the integrated nature 
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of the functions performed by the parties, it would not be realistic or practical to separately calculate 
the respective performances. 
The TPS method identifies the profits which will be split between the respective parties, and thereafter 
allocates the profits on an economically justifiable basis
121
. The division and allocation of profits 
approximates earnings which would have been achieved, in proportion to the respective contributions 
of the parties, had the transaction been concluded in accordance with the arm’s length principle122. 
The advantage of the TPS method, unlike the traditional transaction methods and the TNM method, is 
that it can account for highly integrated transactions where both parties participate in value-add 
activities
123
. The TPS method makes allowances for conditions which are unique to the controlled 
transaction and would therefore not be present in an uncontrolled transaction, while remaining an 
arm’s length approach as it reflects the price and allocation of profits which would have been 
achieved
124
. 
 
2.6 THE ARM’S LENGTH RANGE 
The selection of one of the abovementioned methods depends on the information available in respect 
of the independent comparables, as well as the nature of the controlled transaction. It must be noted 
that the application of one of the transfer pricing methods will not yield a single amount which the 
controlled transaction must replicate, rather it represents a range within which the transfer price must 
be located. If the transfer price falls within in the arm’s length range, the price should be considered as 
being in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Different transfer pricing methods will produce 
different ranges, and as such, the available information should inform the selection of the suitable 
method.  
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2.6.1 CRITICISMS OF THE ARM’S LENGTH APPROACH 
The arm’s length approach has been criticized as being fundamentally flawed insofar as it cannot 
account for situations where there is no comparable uncontrolled transaction. This is particularly the 
case in industries characterised by the presence of oligopolies. 
Further, critics of the arm’s length approach emphasize that the written contracts concluded between 
the parties are accorded undue priority when evaluating the transfer price. This is problematic as the 
written contracts are concluded between connected parties; consequently the same party’s interest is 
therefore reflected on both sides of the contract.  
The transfer pricing treatment of intangibles, particularly intellectual property, raises unique challenges 
for both tax administrations and MNEs. In the South African context, pressing issues which must be 
overcome relate inter alia to the valuation of intangibles and issues of economic versus legal 
ownership
125
. 
The removal of proceeds relating to the sale of intellectual property developed in the Republic is 
subject to exchange control regulations which disallow the relicensing of the intellectual property back 
into South Africa
126
. The purpose of this is to prevent the removal of funds from South Africa through 
excessive royalty payments to South African owners of intellectual property where licensing rights are 
sold to non-residents. The South African entity may continue to perform certain functions relating to 
the maintenance and development of the intellectual property and therefore still participate in any 
profits earned.  While the connected party may be the legal owner of the intellectual property, the 
South African entity, from a SARS perspective, is still the economic owner of the property.  
In light of the true substance of the transaction, the connected party should be compensated as a 
service provider by receiving registration and maintenance fees as opposed to royalties associated with 
ownership
127
, while the South African entity should be taxed as the true owner of the property. Section 
23I of the ITA has been implemented to counter arrangements where a South African entity develops 
and subsequently on-sells intellectual property to a non-resident for use in the Republic. The effect of 
section 23I, which essentially constitutes a specific anti-avoidance mechanism, is to disallow the 
deduction of the royalty payments.  
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Location saving remains a problem for both developed and developing countries. Location saving 
allows MNEs to earn large profits by outsourcing operations to jurisdictions in developing countries 
which have less sophisticated labour law structures and more favourable tax regimes
128
, such that 
profits are shifted in a manner where they erode the tax base of the developing host country.  
Where an MNE outsources its operations to a third party in a developing country, it is unlikely that the 
MNE will pay location saving returns. This is partly due to the host countries unwillingness to request 
the returns as it could result in the MNE transferring its operations to a different developing country 
which does not require location saving returns
129
. In this manner developing countries are exploited by 
MNEs. which utilise developing countries to minimise costs. The result of this is base erosion and 
profit shifting (“BEPS”), which impacts heavily on developing countries as their tax bases are 
considerably smaller than their developed country counterparts. 
The OECD has published a report, entitled Addressing Base Erosion and Profit shifting
130
 as well as 
its action plan
131
, aimed at addressing BEPS. The report indicates that the current provisions on 
intangibles are inadequate and would have to be addressed in the transfer pricing rules
132
. The report 
further highlights that MNEs are structuring their operations in such a manner that they are effectively 
avoiding tax liabilities in developing countries
133
. This has far reaching consequences for the country 
concerned.  
Apart from base erosion implications, businesses located within the developing country also suffer 
indirectly as a result of BEPS by MNEs. This is primarily because of the level of interconnectedness 
which exists — by attempting to increase their competitive positions, MNEs are effectively pricing 
local businesses outside of the market as they incur higher costs to produce the same end product. 
BEPS therefore has long term consequences both for the tax base of the relevant country as well as its 
broader commercial environment.  
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The treatment of intellectual property in the transfer pricing context is an important consideration 
which must be addressed more effectively to limit the exploitation of developing countries. In this 
regard, South Africa is slightly less vulnerable because of the inclusion of section 23I of the ITA 
which acts as a disincentive to developing, selling and subsequently relicensing intellectual property 
into the Republic. The OECD, through both its report and action plan, has acknowledged the 
importance of the treatment on intellectual property, and has reaffirmed its commitment to addressing 
the issue appropriately. 
The current international tax standards have failed to keep pace with the rate of globalization. MNEs 
are able to earn significant profits from a developing country without having a corresponding taxable 
presence
134. Unfortunately, the arm’s length standard is unable to address these difficulties because of 
the slightly outdated international tax principles upon which it is based. However, notwithstanding the 
shortfalls associated with the arm’s length principle, it remains an internationally accepted standard 
against which to judge transfer pricing transactions. Because of its near universal application, the 
arm’s length principle has greatly contributed towards tax parity in the transfer pricing remains, and 
remains a preferable alternative to global formulary apportionment which is mechanistic and static. 
 
2.7 A NON-ARM’S LENGTH APPROACH  
Global formulary apportionment has been proffered as an alternative to the arm’s length principle. 
This method has however not enjoyed widespread application and further, it has not displaced the 
arm’s length approach as the accepted international standard. Global formulary apportionment is 
premised on the apportionment of profits based on a predetermined global formula
135
 
Global formulary apportionment allocates profits to MNEs across various tax jurisdictions on the basis 
of a single formula. Profits would be allocated to a MNE on a consolidated basis
136
. This method 
therefore abandons the separate entity approach. As a result, global formulary apportionment does not 
have the flexibility to account for situations where a division of the MNE in one tax jurisdiction enjoys 
a profit while another division of the same MNE incurs losses in a different tax jurisdiction, as the 
profits are calculated on a consolidated basis. 
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Supporters of global formulary apportionment advocated this method on the basis that it would 
substantially reduce compliance costs for taxpayers as in theory only one set of accounts would need to 
be compiled for the group
137
. Further, they contend that global formulary apportionment would be in 
keeping with economic realities and would provide greater economic and administrative certainty
138
. 
 Global formulary apportionment has been rejected by both the OECD and its member countries.  
Chapter I of the OECD Guidelines specifically excludes this method as a mechanism for calculating 
the transfer price on the grounds that it would inter alia result in double taxation. The OECD has 
further stated that one of the inherent difficulties with a formula based approach is that countries and 
taxpayers could potentially manipulate the formula by emphasising or disregarding certain aspects of 
the formula which would result in a benefit for the entity concerned. In addition, one of the biggest 
shortfalls of global formulary apportionment is that countries would have to agree on a specific 
formula.  Failing such agreement MNEs could potentially be burdened with having to comply with 
different formulas in different tax jurisdictions
139
. 
The advantage of using the arm’s length principle is that it allows MNEs to select the appropriate 
transfer pricing method based on the information available and the nature of the transaction. This 
allows for considerable flexibility; with an approach which takes into account the specific controlled 
transaction as well as the surrounding economic environment. In contrast, global formulary 
apportionment would result in considerable compliance costs as information would have to be 
complied and presented in respect of all the tax jurisdictions in which the MNE operates, taking into 
account the different currencies and government policies in relation thereto. Further, the mechanistic 
nature of global formulary apportionment cannot account for differences which naturally occur across 
different geographical markets. 
The various disadvantages associated with the application of global formulary apportionment has 
resulted in its rejection
140
 and dismissal by the OECD as an alternative to the arm’s length principle 
which is able to provide greater flexibility in the calculation of the transfer price.  The arm’s length 
principle in contradistinction to global formulary apportionment, provides a uniform yet flexible 
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approach to the calculation and treatment of transfer pricing without becoming mechanistic in its 
application like global formulary apportionment. 
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Chapter III 
 
3. TRANSFER PRICING FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE: 
Transfer pricing legislation in South Africa is largely premised on the OECD Guidelines. The focus of 
Chapter III is on the regulation of transfer pricing in the South African context through the application 
of section 31 of the ITA. The emphasis in this chapter will be on the change occasioned by the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2011 (“TLAB 2011”) which resulted in the amendment to section 31 
and the impact thereof on the taxpayer.  
 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Comprehensive transfer pricing and thin capitalisation regulations was achieved through section 
31(“Old Section 31”) of the ITA, which was implemented in South Africa as early as July 1995. In 
addition, SARS issued practice notes on the application of both transfer pricing and thin capitalisation. 
 Prior to the introduction of the Old Section 31, transfer pricing was primarily regulated through a 
combination of exchange control regulations and general anti-avoidance provisions contained in 
section 103(1) of the ITA. Exchange control regulations coupled with high customs duties on imported 
products served to prevent the export of capital from South Africa. However, the drafting of the 
wording of section 103(1) allowed taxpayers to circumvent the regime and bypass the applicable 
levy
141
.  
Section 103(1) only operated to the extent that a transaction or arrangement was entered into 
“solely”142 for the purposes of avoiding tax. If the proposed transaction or arrangement had an 
alternative purpose in addition to the avoidance of tax, the section would be rendered inoperable. In 
many instances, the reduction of liabilities in relation to exchange control and customs duty would 
provide the taxpayer with the requisite underlying business motive and thereby serve to circumvent the 
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application of section 103(1). In recognition of the inherent failures of section 103(1), and the ease 
with which it could be avoided, the Legislature enacted a specific anti-avoidance provision in the form 
of section 31, designed to counter transfer pricing abuses.  
The Old Section 31 of the ITA was subsequently implemented to protect the South African tax base 
from erosion through transfer pricing manipulation. The section underwent a complete overhaul in 
April 2012 (“Revised Section 31”) to further eliminate arbitrages under the old wording of the section. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Law Amendment Bill 2011 (“Explanatory 
Memorandum TLAB 2011”) states that the purpose of the amendment to section 31 of the ITA was 
inter alia to modernise South Africa’s transfer pricing regime and align it internationally accepted 
practice, as encapsulated in the OECD Guidelines
143
. The Explanatory Memorandum TLAB2011 
further states that the reason for the amendment of the Old Section 31 was that the wording of the 
section created “structural problems and uncertainties”144. The previous version placed undue 
emphasis on the literal wording of the contract which allowed taxpayers to pursue artificial arguments 
based on the literal interpretation as opposed to the substance of the transaction. The amendment 
remedied this oversight by providing that the substance of the transaction must take precedence when 
evaluating whether it has complied with the transfer pricing principles as opposed to the literal terms 
of the specific transactions
145
. 
In the 2013/2014 Strategic Plan
146
, SARS noted that, given the current global tax environment, 
multinational corporations are creating and implementing increasingly sophisticated tax avoidance and 
evasion schemes
147
. The 2013 OECD report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
148
, cited by SARS in 
the Strategic Plan, highlights the increasingly sophisticated techniques used by taxpayers to reduce 
their tax liability which include utilising sophisticated cross-border structures, transfer pricing, and 
intra-group transactions to minimise tax obligations in high tax jurisdictions.  
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The amendment resulted in a change of emphasis. Previously, accordingly to the Explanatory 
Memorandum TLAB 2011, the literal meaning of the terms of the transaction, operation, scheme or 
undertaking carried more weight than the substance of the overall transaction, operation, scheme or 
undertaking. The revised wording would take into account whether a benefit was achieved for either 
party to the connected transaction. Section 1 of the ITA defines a tax benefit as being “[…] any 
avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for tax”. The wide definition of a tax benefit 
results in the ability of SARS to adjust the terms of the transaction, operation, scheme or undertaking 
where either party, which is connected to the other as defined, has avoided, postponed or reduced its 
tax liability because of the non-arm’s length nature of the terms of the transaction, operation scheme or 
undertaking
149
.  
The Explanatory Memorandum TLAB 2011 states that apart from emphasising the literal interpretation 
of the terms, excessive weight was placed on the “price” attributed to the transaction as opposed to 
whether a profit was achieved. This approach was not in keeping with that adopted in the tax 
treaties
150
.  Accordingly, the amendment of the Old Section 31 was intended to align South Africa’s 
transfer pricing framework with that contained in the OECD Guidelines. 
The above view taken by SARS in the Explanatory Memorandum TLAB 2011 is understandable 
insofar as the wording of the Old Section 31 unjustifiably placed undue emphasis on the terms of the 
particular transaction as opposed to the overarching profit arrangement achieved, the subsequent 
amendment significantly increased the taxpayer’s compliance burden. Whilst the Revised Section 31 is 
more aggressive in its protection of the South African tax base as it targets the profits as opposed to the 
price of a given transaction, it has also created difficulties for the taxpayer which is now required to 
show that the arrangement viewed in its entirety complies with the provisions of the Revised Section 
31. While this limits the potential for profit manipulation and other avoidance arrangement which may 
be exploited by some taxpayers, it will also create an increased financial and administrative burden for 
all taxpayers engaged in a transfer pricing analysis in light of the reverse onus of proof created by the 
Revised Section 31. 
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3.2 THE TREATMENT OF TRANSFER PRICING UNDER THE OLD SECTION 31 
Transfer pricing was included in South African tax legislation as early as July 1995. Under the Old 
Section 31, transfer pricing and thin capitalisation was dealt with separately under sections 31(2) and 
31(3) respectively
151
, while the relevant definitions of the concept were contained in section 31(1).  
 The Old Section 31 provided the Commissioner of SARS (“Commissioner”) with a discretionary 
power, as evidenced by the use of the word “may” in the proviso to section 31(2), to adjust the taxable 
income of the taxpayer where the transaction between connected parties had not been concluded in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle152. The excessive portion of the consideration was deemed 
to be a dividend and, in terms of section 64(C)(2)(e) of the ITA, subject to Secondary Tax on 
Companies (“STC”) at a rate of 10%153. 
The purpose of the deemed dividend provisions was to account for the removal of value from South 
Africa through transfer mispricing
154
. The wide drafting of the definitions attributed to “goods”155, 
“services”156 and “connected persons”157 ensured that the Commissioner was able to adjust prices in 
respect of both intra-group transactions and those entered into between natural persons
158
. By 
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confining the application of the Old Section 31 to “international agreement[s]”, the Legislature ensured 
that the section would only operate in respect of cross-border transactions.  
Under the Old Section 31, the onus was on the Commissioner to show that the transaction, operations 
scheme or undertaking did not comply with the arm’s length basis. This required the Commissioner to 
perform the transfer pricing analysis. The position under the Old Section 31 created considerably less 
compliance challenges for the taxpayer. Where the Commissioner was satisfied that the transaction, 
operation or scheme violated the provisions of the Old Section 31 he was permitted to adjust the 
consideration payable. The Old Section 31 did not provide any scope for voluntary transfer pricing 
adjustments by the taxpayer
159
. 
 
3.2.1 SARS INTERPRETATION NOTE 7 
SARS issued Interpretation Note No. 7
160
 on 6 August 1999 to assist with the interpretation of the Old 
Section 31. While the various interpretation notes issued by SARS provide guidance on the 
mechanisms and application of the section, they remain the Commissioner’s interpretation of how the 
rules ought to be applied in practice and therefore do not constitute binding rules or guidelines. Each 
transfer pricing case is decided based on the individual merits in light of the particular business 
strategies and commercial objectives of the taxpayer
161
.  
Interpretation Note 7 confirmed the status of the OECD Guidelines as an influential document which 
reflected unanimous undertakings by member countries for the implementation of transfer pricing 
standards
162
. The Interpretation Note acknowledges the OECD Guidelines as an important and 
influential source of transfer pricing, notwithstanding South Africa not being a member state of the 
OECD, in the light of the relevant importance accorded to the OECD Guidelines
163
. In addition, it 
provides that the OECD Guidelines are to be followed in the absence of specific instructions to the 
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contrary from either Interpretation Note 7 or the tax treaties entered into between South Africa and the 
relevant country
164
. 
Interpretation Note 7 accepts the methods set out in the OECD Guidelines for determining an arm's 
length price, namely the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, the cost-plus 
method, the profit split method and the transactional net margin method. The practice note analyses 
each of these methods, indicating when it is appropriate to apply such methods them and pointing out 
the practical problems arising from the application of each of the particular methods. The CUP method 
is cited as being the preferred methodology “as it looks directly to the relevant product or service and 
is relatively insensitive to the functions performed by the entities being compared”165. It must be noted 
that Interpretation Note 7 applied to the application of the Old Section 31. While it may still be 
relevant in the context of the amended section 31, it does require updating in order for it to retain its 
commercial relevance.  
 
3.3 REVISED SECTION 31 
Unlike the Old Section 31, the Revised Section 31 differs from its predecessor insofar as it imposes an 
obligation, as opposed to the discretion provided for under the previous section 31(2), to adjust the 
transfer price where the price is not indicative of an arm’s length. 
 
3.3.1 DEFINITIONS 
Section 31(1) contains the definitions applicable to the section. The definition of “connected person” 
and the inclusion of “affected transaction” are particularly important as the provisions of the Revised 
Section 31 and the powers accorded to the Commissioner are triggered only in respect of an affected 
transaction. 
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3.3.1.1 AFFECTED TRANSACTION 
Section 31(1) defines an affected transaction as being: 
“any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding where- 
(a) that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has been 
directly or indirectly entered into or effected between or for the benefit of either or both 
(i) (aa) a person that is a resident; and 
(bb) any other person that is not a resident; 
(ii) (aa) a person that is not a resident; and 
(bb) any other person that is not a resident that has a permanent 
establishment in the Republic to which the transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding relates; 
(iii) (aa) a person that is a resident; and 
(bb) any other person that is a resident that has a permanent 
establishment outside the Republic to which the transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding relates; or 
(iv) (aa) a person that is not a resident; and 
(bb) any other person that is a controlled foreign company in relation 
to any resident, 
and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another; and 
(b) any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding is different from any term or condition that would have existed had those 
persons been independent persons dealing at arm's length”.  
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The inclusion of affected transactions in the Revised Section 31(1) has considerably widened the scope 
of its application, given the broad construction of the definition
166
. The definition of affected 
transaction read together with section 31(2) simply requires that a transaction be concluded on terms 
which would not have been present had the parties been dealing in accordance with the arm’s length 
principle
167
.  The transaction under review could have been entered into directly or indirectly, for the 
benefit of either i) a resident and a non-resident; ii) a non-resident and another non-resident with PE 
situated in the Republic; and iii) a resident together with another resident which has a PE situated 
outside of Republic to which the transaction relates; or iv) a non-resident and a controlled foreign 
company as defined.  
The new rules and the inclusion of the definition of affected transaction change the focus of section 31 
from one which previously focused on the price of the transaction to one which emphasises whether a 
tax benefit was achieved by either connected party. The wording of the old section 31(2)(c)
168
 only 
permitted the Commissioner power to adjust the transaction for the purposes of calculating the taxable 
income to the extent that the price of the transaction was less or greater than what it could be expected 
to fetch in an arm’s length transaction. 
The shift in focus from the “supply of goods and services” to “transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding” has negated the need for the Commissioner to identify a particular 
transaction for the supply of goods or services
169
. This permits the Commissioner to focus on the 
economic substance of the transaction as opposed to the specific wording of the terms and conditions 
of the agreement. 
The inclusion of affected transaction in section 31(1) also means that MNEs are no longer able to 
engage in benchmarking exercises. The entire transaction must comply with the arm’s length principle 
as opposed to a mere facet thereof. Consequently, the amendment reverses the burden on taxpayer as 
both parties have to show that the transfer price, in light of the functions performed and risks 
undertaken, accord with the arm’s length principle170. 
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3.3.1.2 CONNECTED PERSON 
The second important definition is that of “connected person”. The meaning and ambit of connected 
person is contained in section 1 of the ITA, read together with section 31(4) and SARS’ interpretation 
note
171
 67 (“Interpretation Note 67”). Section 1 of the ITA provides that a connected person is: 
“(a) in relation to a natural person- 
(i) any relative; and 
(ii) any trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme in 
securities) of which such natural person or such relative is a 
beneficiary; 
(b) in relation to a trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme in 
securities)- 
(i) any beneficiary of such trust; and 
(ii) any connected person in relation to such beneficiary; 
(bA) in relation to a connected person in relation to a trust (other than a collective 
investment scheme in property shares managed or carried on by any company 
registered as a manager under section 42 of the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act, 2002, for purposes of Part V of that Act and other than a portfolio 
of a collective investment scheme in securities), includes any other person who 
is a connected person in relation to such trust; 
(c) in relation to a member of any partnership- 
(i) any other member; and 
(ii) any connected person in relation to any member of such partnership; 
(d) in relation to a company- 
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(i) any other company that would be part of the same group of companies 
as that company if the expression "at least 70% of the equity shares of" 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of "group of companies" in 
this section were replaced by the expression "more than 50% of the 
equity shares of or voting rights in" 
(ii) deleted; 
(iii) deleted; 
(iv) any person, other than a company as defined in section 1 of the 
Companies Act, 2008(Act No. 71 of 2008), who individually or jointly 
with any connected person in relation to himself, holds, directly or 
indirectly, at least 20 per cent of 
(aa) the equity shares in the company, or 
(bb) the voting rights in the company; 
(v) any other company if at least 20 per cent of the equity shares of or 
voting rights in the company is held by the other company, and no 
shareholder holds the majority voting rights in the company; 
(vA) any other company if such other company is managed or controlled 
by- 
(aa) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to 
such company; or 
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to a 
person contemplated in item (aa), and 
(vi) where such company is a close corporation- 
(aa) any member; 
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(bb) any relative of such member or any trust (other than a portfolio 
of a collective investment scheme in securities) which is a 
connected person in relation to such member; and 
(cc) any other close corporation or company which is a connected 
person in relation to- 
(i) any member contemplated in item (aa); or 
(ii) the relative or trust contemplated in item (bb); and 
(e) in relation to any person who is a connected person in relation to any other 
person under the foregoing provisions of this definition, such other person: 
Provided that for the purposes of this definition, a company includes a portfolio 
of a collective scheme in securities" 
Section 31(4) further restricts the meaning of connected person in relation to a company by 
disregarding paragraph (d)(v) of the definition. As a result, when performing the connected person 
enquiry in the context of a company involved in an affected transaction in terms of section 31(4), it is 
not necessary for the shareholder concerned to hold the majority voting rights in the company
172
. 
However, it is important to note that the definition of connected person in the context of the Revised 
Section 31 is not especially problematic compared with the amendments occasioned to other aspects of 
the section, as the term has always been defined fairly comprehensively to ensure that all of the correct 
relationships targeted by the provisions are covered. 
 
3.3.1.3 TAX BENEFIT 
The inclusion of tax benefit in the Revised Section 31 will have far reaching consequences for the 
taxpayer. A tax benefit is defined in section 1 of the ITA as including “any avoidance, postponement 
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or reduction of any liability for tax”.  Similarly, tax is widely defined as meaning a “tax or penalty 
imposed”173 in terms of the ITA. 
Where a transaction concluded between connected persons results or will result in a tax benefit, the 
Commissioner is authorised and obliged under section 31(2) to adjust the taxable income or tax 
payable by the relevant party to ensure that the benefit is effectively eliminated. The inclusion of a tax 
benefit increases the application and ambit of the Revised Section 31. Previously the provisions only 
applied to the extent that there was a price difference; in contrast they will now find application in any 
instance where the taxpayer has avoided, postponed or reduced its liability to pay tax as a result of the 
transaction. 
The provision of a tax benefit is included in other sections of the ITA, such as in the context of the 
general anti avoidance rules. Based on the case law
174
, the reduction, postponement or avoidance of tax 
does not necessarily only refer to an existing liability, but also includes a foreseeable obligation
175
. 
Certain critics have indicated that the difficultly with the tax benefit rhetoric is that it places the onus 
on the Commissioner to show that income, but for the transaction, would otherwise have accrued to the 
taxpayer. This necessarily entails that the Commissioner identify the income and the amount thereof 
by which the party’s taxable income must be adjusted176. 
 
3.3.1.4 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
“Financial assistance177 includes the provision of any— 
a) debt; or 
b) security or guarantee”. 
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Financial assistance as defined has been extended by the Revised Section 31. Under the old wording, 
financial assistance was included in the meaning of “services” to mean “the granting of financial 
assistance, including a loan, advance or debt, and the provision of any security or guarantee”. The new 
construction of financial assistance has widened as it now also applies in respect of thin capitalisation. 
This means that the provision of funding to a taxpayer must comply with the transfer pricing rules as 
contained in section 31 viewed in its entirety. 
 
3.3.2 AMBIT AND IMPACT OF THE REVISED SECTION 31 
The application of the Revised Section 31 is automatic where a transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding as contemplated under the concept of an "affected transaction" exists. One 
of the fundamental differences between the Old Section 31 is the duty imposed on the Commissioner 
to effect a primary and possibly secondary adjustment to the taxable income of, or tax payable by, the 
connected party. The Revise Section 31(2) states that the Commissioner “must” recalculate the taxable 
income or tax payable as if the benefit had not existed; peremptory wording which imposes an 
obligation on the Commissioner
178
. In contrast, the Old Section 31(2) stated that the Commissioner 
“may” adjust the consideration in the determination of the taxable income; permissive wording which 
granted the Commissioner a discretion under the Old Section 31. 
The primary adjustment refers to the adjustments effected to the “allocation of taxable profits between 
a South African taxpayer and its foreign connected person to reflect an arm’s length price. In addition, 
a secondary adjustment achieves the result that the excess profits represented by the primary 
adjustment are treated consistently with the position had the original transaction been entered into at 
arm’s length”179. The secondary adjustment allows the Commissioner to re-characterise the excessive 
portion of the transaction and treat it as if had been concluded on an arm’s length basis. For example, 
in the context of thin capitalisation, the proportion of funding deemed to be excessive would be subject 
to a secondary adjustment in terms whereof the Commissioner would re-characterize the difference as 
a loan subject to interest at the arm’s length rate. The inclusion of a secondary adjustment mechanism 
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in the Revised Section 31 provides the Commissioner with means to eliminate the tax benefit achieved 
and adjust the income of the taxpayer to reflect the removal of the tax benefit (unlike under the Old 
Section 31 where only a primary adjustment was permitted). 
The taxpayer’s taxable income under the South African transfer pricing regime will thus potentially be 
subject to both a primary and secondary adjustment. The primary adjustment
180
, provided for in the 
proviso to Revised Section 31(2), effectively neutralises the tax benefit achieved by the transaction
181
.  
The purpose of the primary adjustment is to ensure the appropriate allocation of profits
182
 for the 
purposes of calculating tax. However, under the Old Section 31, the primary adjustment was 
inadequate as it only accounted for taxable income as opposed to actual income
183
, which resulted in a 
tax arbitrage as the Old Section 31 could not account for any differences between taxable and actual 
income.  
However, it must be noted that the primary adjustment afforded under section 31(2) of the Revised 
Section 31 only applies in respect of profits obtained from a South African source or attributable to a 
South African PE. South Africa adopts a source based approach to the taxation of non-residents. To the 
extent that income is earned by a non-resident which is attributable to a South African source, it can 
only be taxed in proportion to the amount attributed to the PE.  
The primary adjustment, authorised in terms of the Revised Section 31(2), only applies where there 
has been a “tax benefit”. To the extent that there is a difference between the initial transfer price and 
the adjusted amount, the Commissioner is empowered to impose a secondary adjustment under the 
Revised Section 31(3). The Revised Section 31(2) empowers the Commissioner to adjust the transfer 
price, with the difference constituting a deemed loan which would attract interest at an arm’s length 
rate. The adjusted or disallowed amount will constitute a deemed loan advanced to the other person, 
generally by a resident to the non-resident counterparty. Interest will be deemed to accrue to the 
resident in respect of such deemed loan until it is settled unless the loan is repaid in full within the 
same tax year
184
. South African residents are taxed on their world wide income, while non-residents 
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are only taxed on their South African income to the extent that it is attributable to a South African 
source. As a result the Revised Section 31(2) would presumably only apply to loans made by a South 
African resident to a non-resident. 
The Revised Section 31 places an obligation on the taxpayer to show that the transaction, operation or 
scheme complies with the transfer pricing rules, and also obliges that taxpayer to effect the transfer 
pricing adjustment in its returns
185
. The shift in onus has created greater burden for the taxpayer in 
terms of complying with the provisions of the Revised Section 31. Previously, under the Old Section 
31 the transfer pricing analysis was performed by the Commissioner who was obliged to proof that the 
consideration payable for the transaction, operation or scheme was not in accordance with an arm’s 
length price. The position has subsequently changed under the Revised Section 31, the taxpayer is now 
required to compile the necessary documentation to substantiate that the transaction accords with the 
arm’s length price. 
Accordingly, the treatment of the primary transfer adjustment has changed under the Revised Section 
31, which provides that it will constitute a deemed loan
186
 which will attract interest at an arm’s length 
rate, whereas under section 31(2) of the Old Section 31 the transfer pricing adjustment was treated as a 
deemed dividend and subject to STC at the applicable rate
187
, on the basis that the deemed dividend 
accounted for the removal of value occasioned by the unjustified transfer price
188
. 
The secondary adjustment
189
 under the Revised Section 31 results in the adjusted loan constituting an 
affected transaction which is subject to the arm’s length principle. Whilst the primary adjustment 
reallocates the taxable profits, the secondary adjustment achieves the result that the difference between 
the adjusted and initial amount is treated as if the initial transaction had been concluded on an arm’s 
length basis
190
. 
Under the Old Section 31, undue emphasis was placed on the literal wording of the transaction, 
operation or scheme. This allowed taxpayers to circumvent the application of the section provided that 
the individual transaction did not violate the transfer pricing rules contained in the Old Section 31. The 
position in this regard has changed under the Revised Section 31 which requires an evaluation of the 
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entire arrangement as opposed to one facet of the transaction. The Revised Section places less 
emphasis on the literal interpretation of the terms and conditions of the transaction and places more 
emphasis on the substance of the transaction. To the extent that the terms and conditions of the 
transaction, operations or undertaking viewed in its entirety violates the provisions of the Revised 
Section 31, the Commissioner is obliged to adjust the consideration payable. This applied even if the 
particular of the specific transaction is innocuous. The shift in focus has imposed a greater compliance 
burden on the taxpayer which will now be required to show that the overall arrangement concluded 
between connected parties complies with the provision of the Revised Section 31. 
The consequence of the application of Revised Section 31 is that the transfer price is adjusted to either 
allocate more income or capital proceeds to a taxpayer or to disallow the excessive portion of an 
expense.  
The objective of the Revised Section 31 is to ensure that a South African resident taxpayer is placed in 
a position sans price manipulation. Consequently the transaction is treated as if the taxpayer simply 
advanced the adjusted amount to the non-resident as an interest bearing loan
191
. This ensures tax 
neutrality from a South African perspective. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4. THIN CAPITALISATION 
Thin capitalisation refers to the funding of a business with a disproportionate degree of debt in relation 
to equity, which enables the foreign investor to receive interest income
192
, and confers on the company 
the benefit of deducting the interest paid (relative to the non-deductibility of dividends paid on equity 
capital).  Thin capitalisation measures are designed to limit the deduction of interest on excessive debt 
funding structures. Prior to the Revised Section 31, thin capitalisation was governed by the Old 
Section 31(3) read together with SARS Practice Note 2
193
.  
The significance of debt or equity funding is in the tax treatment of the different funding structures. 
With the latter, interest payments incurred in the production of income by a person carrying on a trade 
are deductible. In contrast, the distribution of profits, either in the form of dividends or returns of 
capital, is not permitted as tax deductions. 
The previous thin capitalisation regime (the Old Section 31(3)) allowed for a 3:1 debt equity safe 
harbour ratio. Provided that the taxpayer’s funding did not exceed the ratio, the structure would not be 
subject to review by SARS. The subsequent amendment of section the Old Section 31 dramatically 
altered this position as the Revised Section 31 dispensed with the safe harbour provisions and required 
that the funding structure be tested against the arm’s length principle as contained in the Revised 
Section 31.  
The shift from the fixed capital test to determining an appropriate funding structure based on the arm’s 
length principle has significant commercial implications for both resident and non-resident entities. 
The repeal of the safe harbour provisions is problematic insofar as it creates commercial uncertainty. 
The application of the arm’s length principle to funding structures in practice is difficulty as there are 
various considerations which inform the terms of the loan; inherent therein is the relationship between 
the borrower and the lender. The arm’s length principle cannot account for this as it necessarily 
requires that the relationship between the connected parties be disregarded when evaluating the 
structure. 
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Under the Old Section 31(3), read together with SARS Interpretation Note 2, a 3:1 loan funding to 
equity ratio was regarded as acceptable. The test focused on the fixed capital
194
 of the taxpayer in 
relation to its debt.  However, under Revised Section 31, the focus shifted away from the fixed capital 
to whether the terms and conditions upon which it was granted conformed with the arm’s length 
principle and the provisions of the Revised Section 31 viewed in its entirety.  
The amended thin capitalisation rules as contained in the Revised Section 31 effectively broadened the 
scope of thin capitalisation rules to include financial assistance granted by a non-resident to a PE in the 
Republic or any other person that is not a South African resident
195
. 
The increased attention towards thin capitalisation rules is not unique to South Africa. In this regard it 
is not surprising that SARS has considerably revised its thin capitalisation regime. However, the 
implication of doing so is commercial uncertainty, particularly in light of the removal of the safe 
harbour provisions. 
SARS has recently produced a draft interpretation note to deal with the changes occasioned to the thin 
capitalisation regime. In terms of the draft note, certain factors will be taken into account when 
evaluating the funding structure. The 3:1 guideline will no longer apply, however each funding 
structure would have to be considered taking into account all relevant factors, such as the financial 
strategy of the business and the use of comparable data. 
 
4.1 THE OLD SECTION 31(3)  
The granting of financial assistance by a non-resident to a South African resident was previously 
regulated by two tax adjustment mechanisms contained in the Old Section 31(3)
196
. Financial 
assistance was defined in relation to services as “including a loan, advance or debt and the provision of 
security or guarantee”. The first related to the transfer pricing mechanism which applies to the interest 
rate charged, while the second related to the thin capitalisation adjustment mechanism which operated 
in respect of the debt in relation to equity
197
. 
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The Old Section 31(2) empowered the Commissioner to recalculate the price paid for goods and 
services, it did not enable the Commissioner to re-characterise the transaction
198
. The inclusion of the 
Old Section 31(3) was to counter thin capitalisation transactions concluded between connected 
parties
199
. 
Where “financial assistance” is granted by a non-resident to a resident connected person, the Old 
Section 31(3) allowed the Commissioner to adjust the taxable income if he deemed it excessive. 
Interpretation Note 2 restricted the meaning of “financial assistance” to interest bearing financial 
assistance for thin capitalisation adjustments
200
. If the interest bearing financial assistance fell within 
the safe harbour provisions, the Commissioner was not permitted to adjust the consideration in the 
hands of the resident. If the loan, advance or debt was denominated in South African currency, the 
interest rate payable was capped at prime plus 2%, while foreign denominated loans could not exceed 
the inter-bank rate plus 4% in order to fall within the ambit of the safe harbour provisions
201
 . 
Section 31(3) of the Old Section 31 contained the specific thin capitalisation provisions. To the extent 
that the Commissioner was satisfied that the financial assistance granted by a non-resident to a resident 
was excessive in relation to the fixed capital, the Commissioner was allowed to disallow the deduction 
of any interest in relation to the excessive portion
202
. 
The exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion was subject to the Commissioner being satisfied that 
the financial assistance granted was excessive. Notwithstanding a finding that the assistance was 
excessive within the context of section 31(3) of the Old Section 31, the Commissioner was still able to 
allow the deduction provided that the taxpayer could justify the increased financial assistance. 
To the extent that the assistance provided was deemed to be excessive, the excessive portion would 
constitute a deemed dividend and would be subject to STC at the applicable rate in accordance with 
section 64C93)(e) of the ITA. 
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4.2 DRAFT INTERPRETATION NOTE 2 
The Revised Section 31 rendered Interpretation Note 2 and its exposition on the treatment of thin 
capitalisation obsolete. Consequently, the provision of any financial assistance as defined on or after 1 
April 2012 now has to comply with the arm’s length principle as contained in the Revised Section 31. 
Presumably, one of the reasons for broadening the thin capitalisation provisions is to include 
deductions in respect of indirect funding, such as intra-group transactions supplied either directly or 
indirectly by non-resident connected persons, within the ambit of Revised Section 31. The funding of a 
South African resident with excessive intra-group loans, back-to-back financing or intra-group-
guarantees has significant implications for the country’s tax base because of the deductibility of 
excessive interest expenditure
203
. Under the Revised Section 31, these transactions would be subject to 
a primary, and potentially secondary, adjustment if the funding was not provided on an arm’s length 
basis.  
Following the 2012 amendment, thin capitalisation is now dealt with under the general transfer pricing 
provisions of the Revised Section 31(2) and is no longer provided for in a separate sub-section. One of 
the most significant changes occasioned by the amendment is the shift in onus. Previously, the 
Commissioner had to show that the funding structure was contrary to the Old Section 31(3), under the 
Revised Section 31, the taxpayer is obliged to determine the acceptable amount in accordance with the 
arm’s length principle204. 
One of the more commercially significant changes occasioned by the 2012 amendment relates to the 
removal of the safe harbour provisions. Previously debt to equity funding falling within the 3:1 ratio 
would be immune from adjustments. However, with the new requirement that the funding structure 
comply with the section 31(2) of the Revised Section 31, taxpayers no longer have clear parameters 
within which to locate their transactions. The draft interpretation note proposes certain risk factors
205
 
which SARS will use when evaluating if the taxpayer are thinly capitalised. These factors include: 
 the extent of the interest bearing debt and whether it can be serviced without external 
assistance; 
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 the lending terms and whether they have been concluded on an arm’s length basis; and 
 the repayment terms and whether they would have existed in the same form had the 
transaction been concluded between independent parties. 
It is submitted that the changes required by SARS have increased the complexity and cost associated 
with complying with transfer pricing provisions. The requirement that the taxpayer’s funding structure 
comply with the Revised Section 31, and more particularly the arm’s length principle, have created 
commercial uncertainty and instability. Often, inter-company loans are concluded on terms which 
would not ordinarily exist between independent parties, such as providing the target entity with a 
sabbatical from interest payments until it becomes profitable. The old thin capitalisation treatment 
could and did account for this to the extent that the structure would not be disallowed provided that the 
interest rate and debt to fixed capital ratio did not exceed the prescribed safe harbour thresholds. The 
Revised Section 31 cannot account for this as it requires that the terms be the same as that concluded 
between independent parties. 
Under the Revised Section 31, PEs will be viewed as separate enterprises and will be required to 
comply with the same requirements as South African subsidiaries
206
. However, the position is less 
stringent for headquarter companies where the financial assistance granted by a non-resident is applied 
directly to a foreign company in which the headquarter company holds directly or indirectly at least 
10%; or where the headquarter company holds directly or indirectly at least 10% of the equity shares 
in the foreign company to which the financial assistance is supplied
207
. 
With the shift in onus, the taxpayer is now required to calculate and demonstrate that the structure 
accords with the arm’s length principle. Previously, the Commissioner had to show that the taxpayer 
was thinly capitalised. This change in responsibility has significant financial and administrative 
implications for the taxpayer. The taxpayer, under the draft interpretation note, is required to obtain 
comparable qualitative and quantitative factors in support of the lending decision
208
. Apart from the 
monetary implications, this imposes practical difficulties for the taxpayer as there may not be 
sufficient third party information available against which to judge the structure. To the extent that the 
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structure does not comply with the Revised Section 31(2), the excessive portion will be re-
characterised as a deemed loan and will be subject to interest at an arm’s length rate. 
The new thin capitalisation rules require that the taxpayer determine the amount it would have been 
able to borrow in the open market as well as the interest rate which would have been payable. 
Practically speaking this is a difficult endeavour as third party funders engage in a multi-faceted 
inquiry when determining the extent of financial assistance available to the taxpayer. The revised thin 
capitalisation rules, which require that the financial assistance comply with the arm’s length principle 
in the same manner as any other transaction, operation or scheme, fails to take cognisance of the 
commercial realities and the nature of financial assistance. It is posited that the willingness of a lender 
to fund a structure is not determined in isolation, but with specific regard to the individual 
circumstances of the taxpayer. The requirement that the structure be analysed in accordance with an 
arm’s length principle therefore ignores commercial realities. 
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CHAPTER V 
5. CONCLUSION 
The international tax system has not kept abreast with business realities and technological 
advancements which allow MNEs to transact in a country without having a taxable presence. 
Notwithstanding this, the arm’s length principle remains the internationally accepted standard against 
which transaction concluded between connected parties are assessed.  
As indicated in chapters III and IV above, the Revised Section 31 considerably increases the 
compliance burden on taxpayers perform transfer pricing analyses. Transfer pricing has in recent years 
received increased attention and will continue to attract the spotlight, particularly in the developing 
country context. 
 In a recent briefing note published by SARS
209
, SARS indicated that in the 2012/2013 year of 
assessment, it had investigated and audited 16 cases of transfer pricing manipulation with a combined 
audit worth of approximately R3.2 billion, with settlement resulting in approximately R650 million 
worth of collections. In the subsequent 2013/2014 year of assessment, the note referenced particular 
sectors, such as mining and pharmaceuticals, which would be subjected to careful scrutiny going 
forward to ensure that affected transactions are correctly priced
210
. Given the significant amounts 
attached to the transfer pricing audits
211
, coupled with the fiscal instability caused by base erosion, 
transfer pricing is going to become an increasingly regulated sphere of international tax.  As evidenced 
by the aforementioned audit findings, going forward SARS is targeting unsavoury transfer pricing 
arrangements with a view to aggressively protecting the South African tax base. 
The current intentional tax system creates opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting primarily 
through the inconsistent tax treatment of intra-group financial and transfer pricing rules which allow 
for the inappropriate and/or artificial allocation of risk between connected persons
212
. Developing 
countries, such as South Africa, are particularly vulnerable and more likely to be affected by transfer 
                                                 
209“Update on SARS compliance programme” available at 
www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/Documents/UpdateonSARSComplianceProgramme201213.pdf  [accessed 
18/11/2013] 
210
 Ibid 212 pg 2  
211
SARS estimates that the current transfer pricing audit of 30 entities is worth a combined value of approximately R8 
billion [see “Update on SARS Compliance Programme” op cit 212 pg 2] 
212
 SARS 2013/14-2017-18 Strategic Plan op cit 146 at 3.3.4 pg 15 
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pricing manipulation as the current transfer pricing framework favours developed countries over their 
developing counterparts
213
. Comparable data relating to uncontrolled transactions are more readily 
available in developed countries, and, coupled with the shortage of transfer pricing skills and 
expertise
214
, developing countries are particularly susceptible to transfer pricing manipulation resulting 
in significant base erosion.  
Developing countries experience many difficulties in their application of transfer pricing, due in 
particular to their lack of resources, skills and expertise in the area of international tax. The lack of 
access to reliable information relating to uncontrolled transactions is a problem experienced by both 
developing and developed countries alike, however, given the size of developing country economies 
this difficulty is magnified considerably in the developing country context
215
.  
One of the mechanisms being investigated to reduce this hardship is the development of a multi-
country forum where African countries can share expertise and experience on an anonymous basis. It 
is hoped that the pooling of resources will facilitate the implementation and application of transfer 
pricing provisions by developed countries.  
In order to overcome the many difficulties facing developing countries, tax authorities in developing 
countries must focus on the most common types of transactions and sectors in their economy and seek 
to build capacity in relation thereto
216
. Safe harbour provisions historically simplified the compliance 
for small taxpayers. SARS removal of safe harbour provisions is therefore expected to increase the 
complexity already associated with satisfying transfer pricing requirements
217
.  
In light of the above, it is clear that transfer pricing is going to retain the international tax spotlight as 
countries seek to protect their revenue and MNEs explore innovative ways to reduce their respective 
tax liabilities, transfer pricing going forward will therefore continue to play an important role in 
balancing these two competing interests.  
  
                                                 
213
 SARS 2013/14-2017-18 Strategic Plan op cit 146 at 3.3.4 pg 18 
214
 Ibid pg 18 
215
 C Silberztein “Transfer Pricing: A Challenges for Developing Countries” op cit 104 
216
Ibid 
217
 Ibid 
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